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The realization of devices which harness the
laws of quantum mechanics represents an excit-
ing challenge at the interface of modern tech-
nology and fundamental science[1, 2]. An ex-
emplary paragon of the power of such quantum
primitives is the concept of “quantum money”
[3]. A dishonest holder of a quantum bank-note
will invariably fail in any forging attempts; in-
deed, under assumptions of ideal measurements
and decoherence-free memories such security is
guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem [4]. In any
practical situation, however, noise, decoherence
and operational imperfections abound. Thus, the
development of secure “quantum money”-type
primitives capable of tolerating realistic infideli-
ties is of both practical and fundamental impor-
tance. Here, we propose a novel class of such pro-
tocols and demonstrate their tolerance to noise;
moreover, we prove their rigorous security by
determining tight fidelity thresholds. Our pro-
posed protocols require only the ability to pre-
pare, store and measure single qubit quantum
memories, making their experimental realization
accessible with current technologies [5–7].
Recent extensions to Wiesner’s original “quantum
money” protocol [3] have garnered significant interest [8–
11]. One particular extension enables the authentication
of quantum tokens via classical public communication
with a trusted verifier [12]. However, to tolerate noise,
the verification process must condone a certain finite frac-
tion of qubit failures; naturally, such a relaxation of the
verification process enhances the ability for a dishonest
user to forge quantum tokens. It is exactly this interplay
which we, here, seek to address, by focusing on a class
of ”quantum token”-protocols which involve either direct
physical or classical communication verification of qubit
memories.
Our approach to quantum tokens extends the origi-
nal quantum money primitive[3] by ensuring tolerance to
finite errors associated with encoding, storage and decod-
ing of individual qubits. We denote the tokens within our
first primitive as quantum tickets (qtickets); each qticket
is issued by the mint and consists of a unique serial
number and N component quantum states, ρ =
⊗
i ρi,
where each ρi is drawn uniformly at random from the
∗Electronic address: fernando.pastawski@mpq.mpg.de
set, Q˜ = {|+〉, |−〉, | + i〉, | − i〉, |0〉, |1〉}, of polarization
eigenstates of the Pauli spin operators. The mint secretly
stores a classical description of ρ, distributed only among
trusted verifiers. In order to redeem a qticket, the holder
physically deposits it with a trusted verifier, who mea-
sures the qubits in the relevant basis. This verifier then
requires a minimum fraction, Ftol, of correct outcomes
in order to authenticate the qticket; following validation,
the only information returned by the verifier is whether
the qticket has been accepted or rejected.
The soundness of a qticket, e.g. the probability that
an honest user is successfully verified, depends crucially
on the experimental fidelities associated with single qubit
encoding, storage and decoding. Thus, for a given qubit
ρi, we define the map, Mi, which characterizes the over-
all fidelity, beginning with the mint’s encoding and end-
ing with the verifier’s validation; the average channel
fidelity[13] is then given by, Fi = 1/|Q˜|
∑
ρi
Tr[ρiMi(ρi)].
With this definition, the verification probability of an
honest user is,
ph =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr[PaccM(ρ)] ≥ 1− e−ND(Fexp‖Ftol), (1)
where Q = Q˜⊗N , Pacc represents the projector onto
the subspace of valid qtickets, M =
⊗
iMi, Fexp =
1/N
∑
i Fi is the average experimental fidelity, and D,
the relative entropy, characterizes the distinguishability
of two distributions (see Methods for details). Crucially,
so long as the average experimental fidelity associated
with single qubit processes is greater than the tolerance
fidelity, an honest user is exponentially likely to be veri-
fied.
To determine a tight security threshold, we consider
the counterfeiting of a single qticket. For a given toler-
ance fidelity (Ftol) set by the verifiers, a qticket is only
accepted if at least FtolN qubits are validated. In the
event that a dishonest user attempts to generate two
qtickets from a single valid original, each must contain a
minimum of FtolN valid qubits to be authenticated. As
depicted in Fig. 1a., in order for each counterfeit qticket
to contain FtolN valid qubits, a minimum of (2Ftol−1)N
qubits must have been perfectly cloned. Thus, for a set
tolerance fidelity, in order for a dishonest user to succeed,
he or she must be able to emulate a qubit cloning fidelity
of at least 2Ftol − 1. Crucially, so long as this fidelity
is above that achievable for optimal qubit cloning (2/3)
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FIG. 1: a) Depicts the pigeonhole type argument which is
utilized in the proof of qticket soundness. For a tolerance
fidelity Ftol, a qticket is only successfully authenticated if it
contains at least FtolN valid qubits. However, for two coun-
terfeit qtickets, not all valid qubits must coincide. The mini-
mum number of perfectly cloned qubits enabling both qtick-
ets to be accepted is, (2Ftol − 1)N . b) Depicts the quantum
retrieval type situation envisioned for cv-qtickets. For two
verifiers asking complementary “challenge” questions, the op-
timal strategy is for the user to measure in an intermedi-
ate basis. Such a strategy saturates the tolerance threshold,
F cvtol =
1+1/
√
2
2
.
[14], a dishonest user is exponentially unlikely to succeed,
pd =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr
[
P⊗2accT (ρ)
] ≤ e−ND(2Ftol−1‖2/3), (2)
where T represents any completely positive trace preserv-
ing qticket counterfeiting map. To ensure 2Ftol−1 > 2/3,
the tolerance fidelity must be greater than 5/6, which is
precisely the average fidelity of copies produced by an
optimal qubit cloning map [14]. In certain cases, an
adversary may be able to sequentially engage in multi-
ple verification rounds; however, the probability of suc-
cessfully validating counterfeited qtickets grows at most
quadratically in the number of such rounds, and hence,
the likelihood of successful counterfeiting can remain ex-
ponentially small even for polynomially large numbers of
verifications.
Our previous discussion of qtickets assumed that such
tokens are physically transferable to trusted verifiers (e.g.
concert tickets); however, in many situations, this as-
sumption of physical deposition, may either be impos-
sible or undesirable. Recently, it has been shown [12]
that it remains possible, even remotely, for a holder to
prove the validity of a token by responding to a set of
“challenge” questions; these questions can only be suc-
cessfully answered by measuring an authentic token. The
core behind this approach is to ensure that the “chal-
lenge” questions reveal no additional information about
the quantum state of the token.
We now discuss a specific realization of such an ap-
proach, the classical verification quantum ticket (cv-
qticket), and demonstrate its robustness against noise
and operational imperfections. In contrast to the case of
bare qtickets, a cv-qticket holder will be expected to an-
swer “challenge” questions and hence to measure qubits
himself. One might imagine that the ability to par-
ticipate in multiple remote verifications simultaneously
could offer a dishonest user an additional advantage over
the bare qticket case; in particular, certain measurement
strategies may yield an increased likelihood for multiple
successful authentications.
One example of a cv-qticket framework, is to utilize a
set of eight possible two-qubit product states with each
qubit prepared along either X or Z (note that a single
qubit framework is also possible):
{|0,+〉, |0,−〉, |1,+〉, |1,−〉, |+, 0〉, |−, 0〉, |+, 1〉, |−, 1〉}.
We then envision each cv-qticket to consist of n blocks,
each containing r qubit pairs, and thus, a total of n×r×2
qubits; as before, each of the qubit pairs is chosen uni-
formly at random from the allowed set above. A “chal-
lenge” question consists of randomly asking the holder to
measure each block (of qubits) along either the X or Z
basis; naturally, as depicted in Table 1, a valid qubit pair
(within a block) is one in which the holder correctly an-
swers the state for the particular qubit (within the pair)
which was prepared along the questioned basis. For a
given tolerance threshold, an overall answer will only be
deemed correct if at least F cvtolr qubits within each of the
n blocks are found valid. By analogy to the qticket case,
honest users are exponentially likely to be verified so long
as Fexp > F
cv
tol; in particular, since there now exist n
blocks of qubits, each of which can be thought of as an
individual qticket (with r qubits),
pcvh ≥
(
1− e−rD(Fexp‖F cvtol)
)n
. (3)
The proof of cv-qticket security is based upon a gen-
eralized formalism of quantum retrieval games [12, 15],
in combination with a generalized Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound [16] (details in Supplementary Information). So
long as F cvtol >
1+1/
√
2
2 , a dishonest user is exponentially
unlikely to be authenticated by two independent verifiers.
For two complementary “challenge” questions, one finds
that on average, no more than 1 + 1/
√
2 ≈ 1.707 can be
answered correctly. Interestingly, the threshold F cvtol cor-
responds exactly to that achievable by either covariant
3Prepare |−, 0〉 |0,+〉 |1,+〉 |0,+〉 |0,+〉 |+, 1〉 |−, 0〉 |1,+〉
B:Ask Z X
H:Ans. 0, 0 0, 1 1, 1 0, 1 −,+ +,− −,+ +,−
Correct X X X X X X X ×
Block X X
B:Res. Verified
TABLE I: Verification of a single cv-qticket. Here, we con-
sider a cv-qticket with n = 4 and r = 2, totaling 8 qubit
pairs and Ftol = 3/4 (for illustrative purposes only). The
prepared qubit-pairs are chosen at random, as are the bank’s
requested measurement bases (for each block). The holder’s
answer has at most, a single error per block, which accord-
ing to, Ftol = 3/4, is allowed. Secure cv-qtickets require
Ftol > 1/2 + 1/
√
8 and a larger number of constituent qubits.
qubit cloning[17] or by measurement in an intermediate
basis (Fig. 1b.), suggesting that both such strategies may
be optimal [2]. Similar to the qticket case, one finds that
a dishonest user is exponentially likely to fail,
pcvd ≤
(
v
2
)2 (
1/2 + e−rD(Ftol‖
1+1/
√
2
2 )
)n
, (4)
where v represents the number of repeated verification
attempts (for details see Supplementary Information).
Moreover, so long as two verifiers agree to ask comple-
mentary “challenge” questions, participation in simulta-
neous verifications is unable to improve a dishonest user’s
emulated fidelity. Thus, in the case of both qtickets and
cv-qtickets, so long as the hierarchy of fidelities is such
that: Fdishonest < Ftol < Fexp, it is possible to prove both
soundness and security of each protocol.
Next, we consider applications of the above primitives
to practically relevant protocols. For instance, one might
imagine a composite cv-qticket which allows for multi-
ple verification rounds while also ensuring that the to-
ken cannot be split into two independently valid sub-
parts [12]. Such a construction may be used to create
a quantum-protected credit card. Indeed, the classical
communication which takes place with the issuer (bank)
to verify the cv-qticket (via “challenge” questions) may
be intentionally publicized to a merchant who needs to be
convinced of the card’s validity. By contrast to modern
credit card implementations, such a quantum credit card
would be unforgeable and hence immune to fraudulent
charges (Fig. 2a).
An alternate advantage offered by the qticket frame-
work is evinced in the case where verifiers may not pos-
sess a secure communication channel with each other.
Consider for example, a dishonest user who seeks to copy
multiple concert tickets, enabling his friends to enter at
different checkpoint gates. A classical solution would in-
volve gate verifiers communicating amongst one another
to ensure that each ticket serial number is only allowed
entry a single time; however, as shown in Fig. 2b., such
a safeguard can be overcome in the event that commu-
nication has been severed. By contrast, a concert ticket
QBankCard
QBANK$€¥Store 1
User
Store 
2
Store 
3
QticketS# 0429
Concert
Dishonest 
Gate 
1
User
Gate 
2
QBank
Card C
opy 
QBankCard Copy 
Thief
QticketS# 0429
a
b
Friend
FIG. 2: a) Depicts the possibility of using the cv-qticket
framework to implement a quantum-protected credit card.
Unlike its classical counterpart, the quantum credit card
would naturally be unforgeable; this prevents thieves from be-
ing able to simply copy credit card information and perform
remote purchases. b) Depicts a dishonest user who attempts
to copy a concert qticket (e.g. same serial number), enabling
his friend to enter at an alternate checkpoint gate. Naively,
each verifier can communicate with one another to prevent
such abusive ticket cloning. However, such a safeguard can
be overcome in the event that the communication among ver-
ifiers is either unsecured, unavailable or severed (possibly by
the dishonest user himself). The qticket is exempt from this
type of attack since security is guaranteed even in the case of
isolated verifiers.
based upon the proposed qticket primitive would be au-
tomatically secure against such a scenario; indeed, the
security of qtickets is guaranteed even when verifiers are
assumed to be isolated. Such isolation may be especially
useful for applications involving quantum identification
tokens, where multiple verifiers may exist who are either
unable or unwilling to communicate with one another.
While quantum primitives have been the subject of
tremendous theoretical interest, their practical realiza-
tion demands robustness in the face of realistic imperfec-
tions. Our above analysis demonstrates that such noise
tolerance can be achieved for certain classes of unforge-
able quantum tokens. Moreover, the derived tolerance
thresholds are remarkably mild and suggest that proof of
principle experiments are currently accessible in systems
ranging from trapped ions [5, 18] and superconducting
devices [6, 19] to solid-state spins [7, 20–22]. In partic-
ular, recent advances on single nuclear spins situated in
a compact room-temperature solid, have demonstrated
that ultra-long storage times can be attained in combi-
nation with high fidelity initialization and readout [7];
4such advances suggest that quantum devices based upon
single qubit quantum memories may be both practical
and realistically feasible.
While our analysis has focused on describing a primi-
tive based upon single tokens, natural extensions to the
case of multiple identical quantum tokens open up the
possibility of even more novel applications. In particu-
lar, as detailed in the Supplementary Information, it is
possible to extend our threshold results to the case where
c identical copies of the quantum token are issued. In this
case, to ensure that the production of c+1 valid tokens is
exponentially improbable, the required threshold fidelity
must be greater than 1− 1(c+1)(c+2) . The existence of such
multiple identical tokens can provide a certain degree of
anonymity for users and could be employed in primi-
tives such as quantum voting. A crucial question that
remains is whether a rigorous proof of anonymity can be
obtained in a noisy environment. Furthermore, our pro-
posed quantum tokens can also be seen as a basic noise
tolerant building block for implementing more advanced
application schemes; such schemes can range from novel
implementations of quantum key distribution [2, 23–25]
based upon physical qubit transport to complex one-
time-entry identification cards. Beyond these specific
applications, a number of scientific avenues can be ex-
plored, including for example, understanding whether an
interplay between computational assumptions and quan-
tum memories can yield fundamentally new approaches
to encryption.
Methods
Proof of Quantum Ticket Soundness— To
demonstrate the soundness and security of qtickets, we
employ the framework of a Chernoff Bound, which char-
acterizes the central limiting behavior of a set of indepen-
dent random variables; in particular, it provides expo-
nentially decreasing bounds on tail distributions of their
sums. Here, we state a generalization of this bound [16],
Theorem: Generalized Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
Let X1, . . . , Xn be Boolean {0, 1} random variables, such
that for some δi and every S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Pr
[∧
i∈S Xi
] ≤∏i∈S δi. Then
Pr[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn] ≤ e−nD(γ‖δ)
with δ := n−1
∑N
i=1 δi and for any γ s.t. δ ≤ γ ≤ 1.
D(p‖q) = p ln pq + (1 − p) ln 1−p1−q characterizes the dis-
tinguishability of two binary probability distributions,
where Pr(X = 1) = p for the first distribution and
Pr(X = 1) = q for the second. To establish the soundness
of qtickets, we now define the “acceptor”, P ρacc, which
projects a pure N qubit product state onto the subspace
of valid qtickets. As expected, the size of this subspace
will depend on the verifiers tolerance fidelity, Ftol.
Definition: Acceptance Projector
Given ρ =
⊗N
i=1 ρi and a security parameter 0 ≤ Ftol ≤
1, the acceptance projector is given by
P ρacc =
∑
~b:|~b|1≥FtolN
N⊗
i=1
(
biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i
)
.
~b ∈ {0, 1}N is a length N , boolean string with |~b|1 =∑N
i=1 bi, b¯i = 1 − bi, and ρ⊥i = 1 − ρi. Intuitively, |~b|1
can be thought of as a Hamming weight since it charac-
terizes the number of non-zero entries of the string. The
sum is over all strings which have at least FtolN entries
which are 1; thus, the definition of ~b naturally enforces
the projection onto the set of valid qticket states. We now
recall the qubit map Mi which characterizes the overall
fidelity, Fi, of encoding, storage and decoding. We de-
fine Fexp = 1/N
∑
i Fi to be the average achievable ex-
perimental fidelity. This brings us to the statement of
qticket soundness.
Theorem: Soundness of a Quantum Ticket
For Fexp > Ftol, an honest holder successfully redeem a
qticket with probability
pv ≥ 1− e−ND(Ftol‖Fexp).
Proof. Consider a vector composed of boolean random
variables, ~X = (X1, . . . , XN ), with a joint probability
distribution given by
Pr[ ~X = ~b] =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr
[
M(ρ)
N⊗
i=1
(
biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i
)]
=
N∏
i=1
1
6
∑
ρi∈Q˜
Tr
[
Mi(ρi)(biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i )
]
As evidenced, we can consider Xi to be independent
boolean random variables with probability Pr[Xi] = Fi.
Moreover, a simple calculation reveals that Eq. 1 of the
main text can be recast as, 1|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q Tr[P
ρ
accM(ρ)] =
Pr[
∑N
i=1Xi ≥ FtolN ]. Application of the Chernoff
bound yields the desired result.
The security proof for qtickets, detailed in the supple-
mentary information, follows in a similar fashion; it re-
quires the generalized Chernoff-Hoeffding bound to rig-
orously deal with arbitrary counterfeiting attacks, which
may in principle generate correlations between qticket
components.
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S.1. NOTATION AND EXTERNAL RESULTS
The following definitions and external results will be used
extensively throughout the proofs and are included here to
provide a self-contained presentation.
Definition 1 A quantum state t-design is a probability distri-
bution over pure quantum states (pi, | ψi〉) such that∑
i
pi (| ψi〉〈ψi |)⊗t =
∫
Haar
(| ψ〉〈ψ |)⊗t dψ.
In other words, a quantum state t-design duplicates the proper-
ties of the unique unitarily invariant Haar measure over quan-
tum states for all polynomials up to degree t. We will use the
set of states
Q˜ = {| 0〉, | 1〉, | +〉, | −〉, | +i〉, | −i〉} (S1)
with equal weights pi = 1/6; this constitutes a quantum state
3-design overH2 [S1].
The average fidelity for a channel quantifies how well the
channel preserves quantum states.
Definition 2 The Average fidelity of a map M is defined as
F (M) =
∫
Haar
〈ψ |M (| ψ〉〈ψ |) | ψ〉dψ.
Note for example that the average fidelity of a map M is ex-
pressed as a Haar integral of a degree 2 polynomial expression
in bras and kets and can thus be equated to a weighted average
over a quantum state 2-design.
Throughout the text, boolean values B = {True, False}
will be represented as True := 1, False := 0 and the nega-
tion b¯ := 1 − b. We will also use the variable ~b to denote
boolean strings (i.e. ordered sequences of values in {0, 1})
with len(~b) denoting the length or number of components of
a sequence and tl(~b) denoting the string obtained from re-
moving the last element from ~b. We will denote by Pr[e]
the probaility of an event e and Exp[v] the expectation value
of an expression v. Note that according to our convention, if
the expression is a boolean formula they may be used inter-
changeably.
The relative entropy is a distinguishability measure be-
tween two probability distributions. It will be used extensively
(particularly among binary or Bernoulli distributions) and ap-
pears in the definition of auxiliary results. Let 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1,
by abuse of notation, we take D(p‖q) = p ln pq + (1 −
p) ln 1−p1−q , the relative entropy between two Bernoulli prob-
ability distributions with respective parameters p and q. Note
that this definition satisfies D(p‖q) ≥ 2(p− q)2.
The following generalization of the Chernoff-Hoeffding
bound derived by Panconesi and Srinivasan [S2] provides the
same thesis as a standard Chernoff bound while relaxing the
hypothesis to allow dependent random variables.
Theorem 3 (Generalized Chernoff-Hoeffding bound) Let
X1, . . . , Xn be Boolean {0, 1} random variables, such that
for some δi and every S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Pr
[∧
i∈S Xi
] ≤∏i∈S δi. Then
Pr[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ γn] ≤ e−nD(γ‖δ)
with δ := n−1
∑N
i=1 δi and for any γ s.t. δ ≤ γ ≤ 1.
A further generalization to real valued random variables
will also be required. This is adapted to our purpose from
theorem 3.3 of Impagliazzo and Kabanets [S3].
Theorem 4 LetX1, . . . , Xn be real valued random variables,
with each Xi ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that there is a 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
s.t., for every set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, Exp [∏i∈S Xi] ≤ δ|S|
and γ s.t. δ ≤ γ ≤ 1 and γn ∈ N. Then we have that
Pr [
∑n
i=1Xi ≥ γn] ≤ 2e−nD(γ‖δ).
S.2. QTICKETS
We first provide a rigorous definition of qtickets and how
they are verified. We then proceed to our claims, and the
soundness, security and tightness of our security bound (ac-
companied with respective proofs). Namely, we show that
qtickets may be successfully redeemed by an honest holder
achieving a sufficiently good storage fidelity. We then show
that a dishonest holder will have a negligible chance of pro-
ducing two qtickets which are accepted by verifiers from a
single valid qticket, even after repeated verification attempts.
Finally we show how a simple counterfeiting strategy has a
high probability of producing two such qtickets if the verifi-
cation tolerance is set below the threshold value. As an ex-
tension, we consider how our results generalize to producing
multiple identical qtickets.
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2S.2.1. Definition of qtickets
Each qticket consists of a serial number s and an N com-
ponent pure product state ρ(s) =
⊗N
i=1 ρ
(s)
i . For each serial
number s, qticket components ρ(s)i are chosen uniformly at
random from Q˜. This means qtickets ρ(s) are taken uniformly
at random from the set Q = Q˜⊗N (where by abuse of nota-
tion, the elements of Q are N component pure product states
in HQ = HN2 , with components taken from Q˜). The verifiers
store a database containing, for each s, a classical description
of ρ(s) kept secret from ticket holders and the general public.
In order to simplify notation, the serial number s associated to
individual qtickets will be omitted from now on.
In order to use qtickets, they are transferred to a verifica-
tion authority who can either accept or reject them. In both
cases however, the qticket is not returned, only the binary
outcome of verification. The qticket protocol is additionally
parametrized by the fraction Ftol of qubits that a verification
authority requires to be correct in order for verification to suc-
ceed. In order to verify a submitted qticket ρ˜, a full measure-
ment will be performed in the product basis associated to the
original qticket ρ and the number of correct outcomes is then
counted. If more than at least FtolN are correct, the (pos-
sibly noisy) submitted qticket ρ˜ is accepted, otherwise, it is
rejected.
For any pure product state ρ =
⊗N
i=1 ρi we define a pro-
jector P ρacc ∈ L(HQ) associated to the subspace of states that
would be accepted if ρ were a qticket (i.e. states coinciding
with ρ in at least a fraction Ftol of the qubits). The projector
P ρacc offers a more abstract interpretation and may be rigor-
ously defined as
Definition 5 (Acceptance projector) Given a pure N qubit
product state ρ =
⊗N
i=1 ρi and a security parameter 0 ≤
Ftol ≤ 1, we define the acceptance projector
P ρacc =
∑
~b:
∑
bi≥FtolN
N⊗
i=1
(
biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i
)
,
where~b ∈ {0, 1}N is a boolean string.
By abused of notation, ρi and its orthogonal complement
ρ⊥i := 12 − ρi are used as rank 1 projectors in L(H2).
S.2.2. Soundness
The soundness result states that even under imperfect stor-
age and readout fidelity, legitimate qtickets work well as long
as the fidelity loss is not too severe. The completely pos-
itive trace preserving (CPTP) maps Mi will be assumed to
represent the encoding, storage and readout of the i-th qubit
component of the qticket. In this sense, the soundness state-
ment takes place at the level of single qubits. This is neces-
sarily the case, since legitimate qtickets are ruined if a sig-
nificant fraction of the qubits fail in a correlated way. Given
Fi = F (Mi), the average fidelity of the qubit mapMi, we de-
fine Fexp := N−1
∑
Fi to be the average qubit fidelity of the
full map M =
⊗
iMi over all components. The probability
that the “noisy” qticket resulting from this map is accepted as
valid is given by ph(M) = 1|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q Tr [P
ρ
accM (ρ)].
Theorem 6 (Soundness of qtickets) As long as Fexp > Ftol,
an honest holder can successfully redeem qtickets with a prob-
ability
ph(M) ≥ 1− e−ND(Ftol‖Fexp).
Proof. Consider the boolean random variables ~X =
(X1, . . . , XN ) with joint distribution given by
Pr[ ~X = ~b] =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr
[
M(ρ)
N⊗
i=1
(
biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i
)]
.
(S2)
Since M =
⊗
iMi, we may recast Eqn. S2 as
Pr[ ~X = ~b] =
N∏
i=1
1
6
∑
ρi∈Q˜
Tr
[
Mi(ρi)(biρi + b¯iρ
⊥
i )
]
(S3)
Since Q˜ is a quantum state 2-design over qubit space, each
factor coincides with the definition of the average fidelity Fi
of Mi if bi = 1 and with 1 − Fi if bi = 0. Hence the Xi
are independent boolean random variables with probability
Pr[Xi] = Fi. Moreover, according to definition 5, we have
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q Tr[P
ρ
accM(ρ)] = Pr[
∑N
i=1Xi ≥ FtolN ]. Since
theXi are independent, a standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bound
allows us to conclude.
S.2.3. Security
The security statement expresses that for a sufficiently large
security parameter Ftol > 5/6, the average probability of a
dishonest participant successfully forging two accepted qtick-
ets from a single one is exponentially small in N . Indeed,
when simultaneously submitting two qtickets produced by ap-
plying the most general possible transformation T (a CPTP
map) on a single valid qticket, the probability of both of them
being accepted is exponentially small in N as long as we are
not given access to the classical description.
Definition 7 (Counterfeiting fidelity) We define the average
counterfeiting fidelity of a map T ∈ HQ → H⊗2Q as
pd(T ) =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr
[
(P ρacc)
⊗2
T (ρ)
]
(S4)
The following is one of the main results and states that as
long as the verification threshold Ftol is set sufficiently high
a counterfeiter will have negligible chances of producing two
valid qtickets from a single genuine original.
3Theorem 8 (Security of qtickets) For Ftol > 5/6 and for any
CPTP map T ∈ HQ → H⊗2Q we have that
pd(T ) ≤ e−ND(2Ftol−1‖2/3). (S5)
Most of the work for proving this goes into excluding the pos-
sibility that a non-product counterfeiting strategy could per-
form significantly better than any product strategy such as per-
forming optimal cloning on each individual qubit. That is, we
take into account the fact that the map T need not factorize
with respect to the different components of the qticket. Note
also that D(2Ftol − 1‖2/3) = 0 precisely for Ftol = 5/6
and is positive otherwise. Finally, we prove that even if the
holder of a qticket attempts to perform v succesive verification
attempts (each time possibly using information learned from
the acceptance/rejection of previous attempts) the chances of
having two or more submitted qtickets accepted grows by no
more than a factor of
(
v
2
)
.
Theorem 9 (Security of qtickets with learning) If the holder
of a valid qticket submits v tokens for verification, the proba-
bility of having two or more accepted is upper bounded by
pd,v =
(
v
2
)
e−ND(2Ftol−1‖2/3).
Note that since
(
v
2
)
is a polynomial of degree 2 in v, this bound
still allows for an exponentially large number (inN ) of qticket
submissions v, while preserving exponentially good security.
1. Proof outline
We now outline the proof for theorems 8 and 9. First, the
claim in theorem 8 is equated to an equivalent one, which av-
erages over the set of all pure product states instead of Q. We
then bound the average cloning probability by (2/3)N for the
set of pure product states following the lines of R. F. Werner
[S4] for the optimal cloning of pure states. From there, the
generalized Chernoff bound from theorem 3 for dependent
random variables allows us to derive the desired result. The
result of theorem 9 is obtained from a counting argument re-
lating the security of multiple verification attempts with the
static counterfeiting fidelity bound of theorem 8.
2. Equivalence with continuous statement
For the qticket protocol, drawing each component from a
discrete set of states is required in order to provide an efficient
classical description. However, certain statements are sim-
pler to analyze over the full set of pure product states. This
is the case for the counterfeiting fidelity, which can also be
expressed as a uniform average over all pure product states.
Lemma 10 (Counterfeiting fidelity) The average counterfeit-
ing fidelity of a map T can be expressed as
pd(T ) =
∫
d~ρ Tr
[(
P ~ρacc
)⊗2
T (~ρ)
]
(S6)
where
∫
d~ρ represents N nested integrations on the Haar
measure of qubit components and ~ρ the resulting product
state.
Proof. Definition 5 may seem unnecessarily cumbersome, yet
it serves to make explicit that the projector P ρacc is a polyno-
mial of degree 1 in each of the components ρi of the qticket
ρ. Furthermore, note that regardless of what the multi-qubit
map T is, its application T (ρ) has degree 1 in each of the
components ρi of ρ. Together this implies that the integrand
of lemma 10 is an polynomial of degree at most 3 in each of
the qubit components ρi of ~ρ. We may conclude by observing
that the average taken in definition 7 is equivalent to uniformly
taking each component ρi from a qubit state 3-design.
3. Optimal cloning for pure product states
R. F. Werner [S4] obtained a tight upper bound for the aver-
age probability of a CPTP map T producing m clones from n
copies of an unknown pure quantum state | ψ〉. Our statement
is that if one attempts to clone an N component pure prod-
uct state, the optimal cloning probability is achieved by inde-
pendently cloning each of the components; neither generating
entanglement nor correlations may help with the cloning. We
present this statement for the case of cloning two copies from
a qubit product state, but the derivation is fully generalizable.
Lemma 11 (Optimal cloning of pure product states) The av-
erage cloning fidelity over N qubit component pure product
states of a CPTP map T is bounded by∫
d~ρTr[~ρ⊗2T (~ρ)] ≤ (2/3)N .
Proof. One possible derivation of this lemma is by follow-
ing the lines of the original proof for optimal cloning of pure
states [S4]. First one shows that if there is a cloning map T
achieving average fidelity F ? then there is a covariant cloning
T ? achieving the same average fidelity. This map can be ex-
plicitly constructed as
T ?(~ρ) =
∫
d~g ~g†⊗2T (~g~ρ~g†)~g⊗2, (S7)
where the integral
∫
d~g averages over all possible local rota-
tions ~g on N subsystems. This covariant map achieves ex-
actly the same cloning fidelity for any initial pure product
state since all pure product states are equivalent up to local
unitaries. Finally, we observe
0 ≤ Tr[~ρ⊗2T ?(12N − ~ρ)] (S8)
since 12N − ~ρ is positive and T ? positivity preserving. We
then obtain
F ? ≤ Tr[~ρ⊗2T ?(12N )] (S9)
and may now average this inequality over ~ρ and use∫
d~ρ ~ρ⊗2 =
(S2)
⊗N
3N
, (S10)
4where S2 is the rank 3 projector onto the symmetric space
of two qubits. The operator norm of this expression is 1/3N
whereas Tr[T ?(12N )] ≤ 2N leading to F ? ≤ ( 23 )N , as de-
sired.
4. Pigeonhole argument and Chernoff bound
We are now ready to prove the first no-counterfeiting result
for qtickets.
Proof of theorem 8. Consider the boolean random variables
~E = (E1, . . . , EN ) with joint distribution given by
Pr[ ~E = ~b] =
∫
d~ρTr
[
T (~ρ)
N⊗
i=1
(
biρ
⊗2
i + b¯i(14 − ρ⊗2i )
)]
.
(S11)
Intuitively, the variable Ei represents the event of measuring
the i-th component to be correctly cloned.
In order for the two qtickets to be accepted, there must be
a total of at least FtolN components yielding the correct mea-
sured outcome in each qticket. By the pigeonhole principle,
this means that there are at least 2FtolN − N components
which were measured correctly on both submitted qtickets,
pd(T ) ≤ Pr
[
N∑
i=1
Ei ≥ (2Ftol − 1)N
]
. (S12)
For arbitrarily chosen T , the Ei may be dependent variables.
However, according to lemma 11, for any subset S of qubit
components, we may bound
Pr[∀i∈SEi] ≤
(
2
3
)|S|
. (S13)
Theorem 3, is now invoked to provide an upper bound on the
RHS of eq. 12, yielding the thesis of theorem 8.
5. Combinatorial bound on learning
The bound on counterfeiting that we have provided assumes
that two (possibly entangled) counterfeits are produced by ap-
plying a CP map on a single original copy. In contrast, a
sequential strategy temporally orders the submitted qtickets
where the production strategy (CP map) for the later submis-
sions can depend on whether previous submissions where ac-
cepted or not. The counterfeiter may learn valuable informa-
tion about how to construct valid qtickets from the feedback
provided by the verifiers. The content of theorem 9 is that
even with a valid qticket and the information learned from v
repeated submissions it is very unlikely for a counterfeiter to
produce more than one accepted qticket.
Proof of theorem 9. According to theorem 8, the proba-
bility pd(T ) for any CP map T to produce two valid coun-
terfeit copies from a single one, is upper bounded by B =
e−ND(2Ftol−1‖2/3). We bound the counterfeiting probability
of an interactive strategy S submitting v tokens for verifica-
tion by the sum of the counterfeiting fidelity of
(
v
2
)
CP maps
Tk,l. Each of these maps corresponds to the case in which a
specific pair (k, l) of the v submitted tokens are the first to be
accepted by the verifiers.
Without loss of generality, we assume that in an interactive
strategy the holder waits for the outcome of the j-th verifica-
tion in order to decide how to continue and produce the j+1-th
submission. We model a v step interactive strategy S as a col-
lection of CPTP maps {S~b} with ~b a boolean string of length
between 0 and v − 1 representing what the counterfeiter does
after receiving the first len(~b) verification outcomes.
Each S~b is a CPTP map fromHH toHQ⊗HH , whereHQ
is a Hilbert space accommodating qtickets andHH is a larger
space representing the memory of the holder.
For any partial verification result~b we may write the CPTP
map which produces the len(~b) submissions as S˜tl(~b), which
is composed of successively applying S~b′ for all initial sub-
strings ~b′ of~b. That is
S˜∅ :=S∅
S˜~b :=
(
id
⊗ len(~b)
Q ⊗S~b
)
◦ S˜tl(~b).
(S14)
Figure S1: a) We schematically illustrate how a dynamical strategy
S works. Each step of a strategy (grey rectangles) is a CPTP map
S~b which depends on the classical outcome ~b of previous verifica-
tions. The first map S∅ takes an original qticket ρ as input, whereas
subsequent steps rely on an internal memory state of the holder. The
content of internal memory could range from no information at all, to
a full original qticket and a detailed register of previous submissions.
The verifiers have a fixed strategy Πρ which consists of applying the
measurement {P ρacc, P ρrej} and only returning the classical boolean
measurement outcome. b) By fixing the classical input~b to the strat-
egy, a CPTP map S˜~b ∈ HQ → H⊗ len(
~b)+1
Q ⊗ HH is constructed,
corresponding to one possible partial application of the strategy S.
This CPTP map produces len(~b) + 1 possibly entangled outputs in
HQ from a single input qticket.
For an interactive strategy S the probability that the first
len(~b) verification outcomes are given by~b is expressed as
p~b(S) =
1
|Q|
∑
ρ∈Q
Tr[S˜tl(~b)(ρ)
len(~b)⊗
j=1
(
bjP
ρ
acc + b¯jP
ρ
rej
)
⊗1H ],
(S15)
where P ρrej := 1Q − P ρacc. The probability for the interactive
strategy S to succeed at counterfeiting in v steps can be de-
scribed as the sum of these probabilities over all possible full
5verification outcomes including at least two acceptances
pd,v(S) =
∑
~b:
∑
bi≥2
len(~b)=v
p~b(S). (S16)
The key idea now is to use p~b(S) = p~b0(S) + p~b1(S) to pro-
vide an alternate expression for this sum. Namely, we com-
bine verification outcomes starting in the same way into a sin-
gle summand while avoiding the inclusion of failed counter-
feiting attempts. Each full verification outcome containing
two or more successful verifications has a unique shortest ini-
tial substring containing exactly two successful verifications.
That a given substring is the shortest can be guaranteed by tak-
ing the last verification of the substring to be one of the two
accepted.
pd,v(S) =
∑
~b:
∑
bi=2
b
len(~b)
=1
p~b(S). (S17)
Each of the
(
v
2
)
summands on the RHS of Eq. (S17), may be
characterized by two indices k, l s.t.
~b =
k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 . . . 0 1
l−k−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 . . . 0 1 for some k < l ≤ v. (S18)
For each one of these summands, we construct a static strategy
Tk,l(ρ) = Tr\k,l[S˜tl(~b)(ρ)] which takes as input a single valid
qticket ρ and submits exactly two tokens. The counterfeiting
probability of this map on ρ is
Tr
[
(P ρacc)
⊗2
Tk,l(ρ)
]
= Tr
[
(P ρacc)
⊗2
Tr\k,l[S˜tl(~b)(ρ)]
]
= Tr[S˜tl(~b)(ρ)
len(~b)⊗
j=1
(
bjP
ρ
acc + b¯j1Q
)⊗ 1H ]
≥Tr[S˜tl(~b)(ρ)
len(~b)⊗
j=1
(
bjP
ρ
acc + b¯jP
ρ
rej
)
⊗ 1H ].
(S19)
By averaging over ρ ∈ Q we obtain p~b(S) ≤ pd(Tk,l) ≤ B
and invoking Eq. (S17) we obtain pd,v(S) ≤
(
v
2
)
B.
S.2.4. Tightness
For Ftol < 5/6 applying an optimal qubit cloning map[S4]
Λ(ρ) = 13ρ ⊗ ρ + 16ρ ⊗ 1 + 161 ⊗ ρ on each of the in-
dividual qubits of the qticket provides a good counterfeiting
probability. The plot in Fig. S2 illustrates the probability of
counterfeiter to actually get two qtickets accepted when taking
this approach. For each of the two counterfeited qtickets, the
probability of failing verification is the cumulant of a binomial
distribution B(N, 5/6) up to FtolN and rejection probability
may be upper bounded by 12 exp(−2N(5/6 − Ftol)2) using
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Figure S2: We numerically calculate the probability of accepting
two copies of a qticket when the adversary strategy is assumed to be
independently cloning each of theN qubits using an optimal cloning
map. We see that the probability of producing two accepted qtickets
approaches a step function at 5/6 with N .
Hoeffding’s inequality. Even when failure of the two qtickets
is anticorrelated, the probability of either of them failing veri-
fication can not excede the sum. This shows that a the scheme
can not be made secure for Ftol < 5/6. While such a scheme
provides optimal forging probability when (Ftol = 1), other
schemes could in principle outperform it in terms of counter-
feiting capability. Althought this is in principle possible, our
security result shows that assymptotically inN , no other strat-
egy may work for Ftol > 5/6.
S.2.5. Extension: Issuing multiple identical qtickets
Our results admit generalization to a scenario where the c
identical copies of each qtickets are issued and succesful ver-
ification of c + 1 is to be excluded. To obtain an analog of
lemma 10 requires the individual qubits composing a qticket
to be drawn at random from a state t-design with t = c+(c+1)
(for example t = 5 would already be needed if two identical
copies are issued). The optimal c → c + 1 cloning probabil-
ity for N component product states is in this case bounded by(
c+1
c+2
)N
. The threshold fidelity required to guarante security
is then given by Ftol > 1 − 1(c+1)(c+2) For such an Ftol, the
analogous result to theorem 8 one obtained is
pc→c+1(T ) ≤ e−ND((c+1)Ftol−c‖
c+1
c+2 ). (S20)
Finally, if v > c + 1 verification attempts are allowed, the
probability of counterfeiting can be proven not to grow faster
than
(
v
c+1
)
. The proofs of these claims completely follow the
lines that have been presented. Striving for legibility, we have
limited the proof presented to c = 1, thus avoiding the nota-
tional burdon imposed by the extra indices required.
6S.3. CV-QTICKETS
In this section we provide a proof that cv-qtickets are se-
cure, not only against counterfeiting but also against any other
possible double usage. We first present definitions for cv-
qtickets and their verification. We then state the associated
soundness and security guarantees and outline the security
proof. Only the proof of the security statement is provided,
since proving soundness for cv-qtickets requires no additional
techniques as compared to soundness of qtickets.
S.3.1. Definition of cv-qticket
Each cv-qticket is composed of n × r qubit pairs. Each
qubit pair is prepared by choosing a state from
{|0,+〉, |0,−〉, |1,+〉, |1,−〉, |+, 0〉, |−, 0〉, |+, 1〉, |−, 1〉}
uniformly at random.
A full verification question for the cv-qticket will consist of
n randomly chosen axes from {X,Z} each corresponding to
a specific block of r qubit pairs. In principle, the holder of the
cv-qticket then measures the polarization of every qubit com-
ponents along the corresponding requested axis and commu-
nicates the measurement outcomes to the verifier. The criteria
to consider an answer correct is the following; within each of
the n blocks, at least Ftolr of the reported outcomes corre-
sponding to qubits prepared in a polarization eigenstate of the
inquired axis should be given correctly.
S.3.2. Soundness
The soundness result states that even under imperfect stor-
age and readout fidelity, legitimate cv-qtickets work well as
long as the fidelity loss is not too severe. Again, the com-
pletely positive trace preserving (CPTP) maps Mj will be as-
sumed to represent the encoding, storage and readout of the
j-th qubit component of the cv-qticket, with the full map over
all components given by M =
⊗
j∈{1,...,2r×n}Mj . In the
case of cv-qtickets, sufficiently many (Ftolr) correct answers
should be provided within each block, demanding that a suffi-
ciently good average fidelity be implemented for every single
block. A random remapping of the Cartesian axes for each
qubit component of a cv-qticket is also necessary, and can
be achieved via a random unitary (possibly from a unitary 2-
design). This is required for example in the case where an
actual physical polarization, say X , is lost faster than other
components. In this case asking for the stored X polarization
for all qubits in a block may yield a large failure probability
even though the average storage fidelity among the qubits is
sufficiently high. A random unitary remapping solves this and
allows to connect with the average qubit storage fidelity, even
in the case where only two nominal axes are used.
Given Fj = F (Mj), the average fidelity of the qubit map
Mj , we define Fexp,b := N−1
∑
j:d j2r e=b Fj to be the av-
erage qubit fidelity within block b ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Further-
more, to simplify the final expression, let us define Fexp =
minb Fexp,b.
Theorem 12 (Soundness of cv-qtickets) As long as Fexp >
Ftol, an honest holder implementing a map M can success-
fully redeems cv-qtickets with a probability
pcvh (M) ≥
(
1− e−rD(Fexp‖Ftol)
)n
.
Observe that one may reduce this statement to n independent
statements within each block which are completely analogous
to the soundness for qtickets theorem 6.
S.3.3. Security
A naive security statement expresses that the holder of a
single cv-qticket is unable to produce two copies from it, each
with the potential of passing a verification. Since the verifi-
cation of cv-qtickets is achieved by sending a classical mes-
sage to a verifier, the security statement for cv-qtickets goes
beyond this; it states that even with simultaneous access to
two randomly chosen verification questions, the holder of a
cv-qticket is exponentially unlikely to provide satisfactory an-
swers to both. We further extend our security claim, to an even
more adverse scenario; the holder of a cv-qticket has simulta-
neous access to v independent verification questions and may
proceed to answer them in any chosen order. Moreover failing
in verification attempts does not forbid the holder from further
attempts which may possibly be performed relying on the in-
formation accumulated from previous verification outcomes.
Let S be a mathematical object denoting the counterfeiting
strategy taken by the holder of a valid cv-qticket. We will de-
note by pcvd,v(S), the probability that strategy S leads to two or
more successful verifications when engaging in v verification
attempts with possibly independent verifiers. The probability
is taken over the random generation of cv-qtickets, of verifi-
cation questions, and of measurement outcomes (Born’s rule).
The security statement is then
Theorem 13 (Security of cv-qtickets) For any counterfeiting
strategy S and tolerance parameter Ftol >
1+1/
√
2
2 we have
pcvd,v(S) ≤
(
v
2
)2 (
1/2 + e−rD(Ftol‖
1+1/
√
2
2 )
)n
.
The proof of this statement goes as follows. Since ab-
stractly cv-qtickets consist of a set of randomly produced
states and questions requested on these states the formalism
of quantum retrieval games (QRGs) provides adequate mod-
eling. This framework is presented in a largely self-contained
manner, since its generality and potential make it of indepen-
dent interest. We first provide basic definitions for QRGs
and derive some simple results. Then we present possible
ways of composing QRGs together with associated quantita-
tive bounds. The first results are then applied to the qubit pair
constituents of cv-qtickets to bound the holders potential to
provide answers to complementary question. Cv-qtickets are
7then modeled by a QRG for scenarios in which the holder of
a cv-qticket wishes to simultaneously answer questions from
two independent verifiers without any additional aid. Finally,
a combinatorial bound, similar to the one used for qtickets, is
used to provide an upper limit on how the double verification
probability may increase with the number v of verification at-
tempts.
S.3.4. Quantum retrieval games
Quantum retrieval games (QRGs), recently defined by
Gavinsky [S5] provide a framework to analyze protocols in
which information is to be extracted from a state produced ac-
cording to a classical probability distribution. We will here
present a definition of QRGs following Gavinsky as well as
some additional results derived which may be of independent
interest.
Alice prepares a normalized state ρs = %(s)/ps accord-
ing to the probability ps := Tr[%s] and transfers it to Bob.
Whereas Alice remembers the index s of the generated state,
Bob is only provided with ρs and a full description of the dis-
tribution from which it was generated. Alice then asks Bob a
question about s which Bob attempts to answer as best as pos-
sible. A simple possibility is for Alice to directly ask Bob the
value of s. In general however, the set of possible answers A
need not coincide with the set of indexes S over the possible
prepared states. If each answer a is either correct or incorrect
the question may be modeled as σ ∈ S × A → {0, 1}. This
is, σ(s, a) = 1 iff the answer a is correct for state index s
and σ(s, a) = 0 otherwise. This definition faithfully repre-
sents Gavinsky’s QRGs. We extend this notion to weighted
quantum retrieval games (WQRGs) to model situations where
some answers are “more correct” than others. Here for each
prepared state s and possible answer a the game will assign a
non-negative real value σ(s, a) associated to the utility func-
tion of answer a given input s (i.e. σ ∈ S ×A→ R+).
Bob needs to choose an answer a ∈ A and may use his copy
of state ρs to do so. The most general strategy that Bob can
take according to the laws of quantum mechanics is to per-
form a positive operator valued measurement (POVM). We
will consider post-selected POVMs, as opposed to a physi-
cal POVM, as those which may fail to produce a measure-
ment outcome. This is, whereas a physical POVM always
produces an outcome from the expected set, for post-selected
POVM some “invalid” outcomes are discarded and excluded
from statistics.
In order to express the random preparation of states by Al-
ice we first define the notion of an indexed ensemble.
Definition 14 (Indexed ensemble) We will say that % is an
ensemble on H indexed over S iff ∀s ∈ S : %(s) is a posi-
tive operator onH and∑s∈S Tr[%(s)] = 1.
Note that if % is an indexed ensemble, then ρ =
∑
s %(s) is
a normalized density matrix. Although Alice gives a spe-
cific state %(s)/Tr[%(s)] to Bob, since Bob does not know
s, he does not know which one has been received. The state
ρ = TrAlice[
∑
s∈S s⊗%(s)] will be called the reduced density
matrix of % since it corresponds to tracing out Alice’s classi-
cally correlated subsystem containing the index s. Without
loss of generality, ρ can be assumed to be full rank onH.
In other words, a physical/selective projection P indexed
over A is simply a physical/post-selected POVM equipped
with an interpretation for each possible measurement outcome
in terms of possible answers in a ∈ A.
Definition 15 (Selective and physical projections) We will
say that P is a selective projection indexed over A iff ∀a ∈ A,
P(a) are bounded positive semidefinite operators on H. It
will also be a physical projection iff
∑
a P(a) = 1.
Note that no normalization has been imposed for selective
projections since induced probability distributions are normal-
ized a posteriori. An indexed ensemble and a projection on the
same Hilbert space induce a joint probability distribution over
the indexes S ×A of prepared states and provided answers.
Definition 16 (Induced probability distribution) Let % be
an ensemble on H indexed over S and let P be a projection
onH indexed over A. Then
p(s0, a0) =
Tr[P(a0)%(s0)]∑
s,a Tr[P(a)%(s)]
. (S21)
is a probability distribution over S×A which will be denoted
by p = 〈%,P〉 and is undefined unless ∑s,a Tr[P(a)%(s)] >
0.
Furthermore, note that for physical projections the denomina-
tor in Eq. (S21) is 1 and the marginal of the resulting dis-
tribution over S is p(s) =
∑
a p(s, a) = Tr[%(s)] which is
independent of P .
Definition 17 (Weighted quantum retrieval games) Let %
be an ensemble on H indexed over S. Consider a utility
function σ ∈ S × A → R+. Then the pair G = (%, σ) is a
weighted quantum retrieval game. A WQRG is also a QRG
when σ ∈ S ×A→ {0, 1}.
The value of a game G w.r.t. a projection P is the average
utility obtained by Bob by using a certain measurement strat-
egy P . This value is given by the expectancy of the utility
function σ over the joint distribution of prepared states and
measurement outcomes.
Definition 18 The value of game G = (%, σ) w.r.t. projection
P is defined as
Val(G,P) :=
∑
s,a
p(s, a)σ(s, a) (S22)
where p = 〈%,P〉 is the induced probability distribution.
We now define the optimum value achievable by Bob for two
distinct conditions depending on whether selective or physical
projections are allowed.
Definition 19 The selective (respectively physical) value of a
game G are defined as
Sel(G) := sup
P∈Selective projections
Val(G,P) (S23)
8Phys(G) := sup
P∈Physical projections
Val(G,P). (S24)
Note that according to this definition Sel(G) ≥ Phys(G) since
the supremum is taken over a larger set. However, for certain
tailored games, the selective and physical values will coincide.
The advantage of selective values is that they may be straight-
forwardly computed and are more amenable to compositional
results. If Bob is forced to provide an answer, he can only
achieve the physical value of a game. If Bob is allowed to
abort the game after measuring his state ρs and aborted games
are not considered when calculating his expected utility then
he will be able to achieve the selective value.
The following result provides an explicit formula to calcu-
late the selective value of a game. In this sense, it is a gener-
alization of lemma 4.3 in [S5].
Theorem 20 (Selective value of a game) Let G = (%, σ)
be a WQRG with
∑
s %(s) = ρ. Define O(a) :=∑
s σ(s, a)ρ
−1/2%(s)ρ−1/2. Then the selective value of G
may be calculated as Sel(G) = maxa ‖O(a)‖, where ‖ · ‖
denotes the operator norm.
Proof. We first use the definition of the value of a game G
w.r.t. P , expand the induced probability distribution and move
the sum over s inside the trace
Val(G,P) =
∑
a Tr[P(a)
∑
s σ(s, a)%(s)]∑
a Tr[P(a)
∑
s %(s)]
. (S25)
We define P˜ such that P˜(a) = ρ1/2P(a)ρ1/2. Using this
definition and that of ρ and Oa we may rewrite
Val(G,P) =
∑
a Tr[P˜(a)O(a)]∑
a Tr[P˜(a)]
≤ max
a
Tr[P˜(a)O(a)]
Tr[P˜(a)]
≤ max
a
‖O(a)‖.
(S26)
The first inequality uses the positivity of all summands. For
the second inequality we note that P˜(a) must be positive
semidefinite and the variational definition of operator norm
of the positive semidefinite operator O(a). Equality can be
achieved by taking P˜(a0) to be a projector onto the highest
eigenvalue subspace of O(a0) if ‖O(a0)‖ = maxa ‖O(a)‖
and taking P˜(a0) = 0 otherwise.
The theorem provides an explicit construction of a projec-
tion achieving the selective value of a game. Furthermore, the
proof allows us to derive a necessary and sufficient condition
under which the selective and physical values of a game coin-
cide.
Corollary 21 Given a retrieval game G, we have that
Sel(G) = Phys(G) iff there exist positive P˜(a) such that
O(a)P˜(a) = Sel(G)P˜(a) and
∑
a
P˜(a) = ρ (S27)
We now turn to the systematic composition of retrieval
games in the form of product and threshold games. This pro-
vides a way to construct more elaborate retrieval games to-
gether with bounds on their associated values. A natural defi-
nition of tensor product may be given for indexed ensembles,
projections and utility functions.
(%1 ⊗ %2)(s1, s2) = %1(s1)⊗ %2(s2) (S28)
(P1 ⊗ P2)(a1, a2) = P1(a1)⊗ P2(a2) (S29)
(σ1 ⊗ σ2)((s1, s2), (a1, a2)) = σ1(s1, a1)σ2(s2, a2) (S30)
These definitions have the property that the tensor product of
physical projections is a physical projection and that the in-
duced probability distribution of two tensor product is the ten-
sor product of the individual induced probability distributions
〈(%1 ⊗ %2), (P1 ⊗ P2)〉 = 〈%1,P1〉 ⊗ 〈%2,P2〉
Definition 22 (Tensor product WQRG) Let G1 = (%1, σ1)
and G2 = (%2, σ2). We define the tensor product WQRG G1 ⊗
G2 as
G1 ⊗ G2 = (%1 ⊗ %2, σ1 ⊗ σ2).
Proposition 23 (Tensor product selective value) The selec-
tive value of a tensor product game is the product of the selec-
tive value of the independent games.
Sel(G1 ⊗ G2) = Sel(G1) Sel(G2)
Proof. By using the definition of O(a) in theorem 20 with
respect to the WQRG involved we obtain
‖O(a1, a2)‖ = ‖O1(a1)⊗O2(a2)‖ = ‖O1(a1)‖‖O2(a2)‖.
Maximizing over a1 and a2 on both sides theorem 20 provides
the desired equality.
The selective value of the product game is attained by the
tensor product of projections, each achieving the respective
selective values.
Corollary 24 (Tensor product physical value) If
Phys(G1) = Sel(G1) and Phys(G2) = Sel(G2) then
Phys(G1 ⊗ G2) = Sel(G1 ⊗ G2).
Given a direct product game and a projection for it one may
consider the inverse procedure of defining a projection on one
of the subcomponents of the game.
Definition 25 (Restriction of a projection) Let P be a pro-
jection on H1 ⊗ H2 indexed over A1 × A2. Furthermore,
let ρ2 be a normalized density matrix on H2. We define the
restriction P|1 with respect to ρ2 and A2 as
P|1(a1) =
∑
a2
Tr2(P(a1, a2)1⊗ ρ2).
By abuse of notation, if ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 is a normalized product
state in H1 ⊗ H2 we may define the restriction of P with
respect to the normalized tensor factors of ρ. This is the case
for the reduced density matrix of product indexed ensembles.
By restricting a projection one obtains a new projection which
induces the same reduced probability distribution
9Lemma 26 (Restriction of a projection) Let P|1 be the re-
striction of P with respect to ρ2 and A2, where ρ2 is the re-
duced density matrix of %2. Then
〈%1,P|1〉(s1, a1) =
∑
s2,a2
〈%1 ⊗ %2,P〉(s1s2, a1a2).
Theorem 27 (Selective value of threshold QRG) Let Gj =
(%j , σj) be WQRGs s.t. σj ∈ (Sj , Aj) → [0, 1] and
Sel(Gj) = δj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore take
δ = n−1
∑n
j=1 δj and δ ≤ γ ≤ 1. Define the QRG
Gγ = (
⊗
j %j), σγ) with a tensor product ensemble distri-
bution and boolean utility function
σγ(~s,~a) =
 n∑
j=1
σj(sj , aj) ≥ γn
 .
Then we have Sel(Gγ) ≤ 2e−nD(γ‖δ).
Proof. The direct product indexed ensemble % =
⊗
j %j and
projectionP induce a normalized probability distribution over
~S × ~A given by
p(~s,~a) =
Tr[P(~a)%(~s)]∑
~s~a Tr[P(~a)%(~s)]
.
Define the dependent random variable Xj to be σj(sj , aj)
where sj and aj are taken according to this probability dis-
tribution. For any S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we may define P|S as the
restriction of the projection P to the subsystems specified by
S with respect to (ρ~s). By proposition 23 we have that
Exp
∏
j∈S
Xj
 = Val
⊗
j∈S
Gj ,P|S
 ≤∏
j∈S
δj . (S31)
Using theorem 3 and definition 18 we obtain
Val (Gγ ,P) = Pr
∑
j
Xj ≥ γn
 ≤ 2e−nD(γ‖δ). (S32)
Since this is true for arbitrary P we conclude that Sel(Gγ) ≤
2e−nD(γ‖δ).
S.3.5. cv-qticket qubit pair building block
Consider a game in which Alice transfers to Bob one of the
following states chosen at random
S = {|0,+〉, |0,−〉, |1,+〉, |1,−〉, |+, 0〉, |−, 0〉, |+, 1〉, |−, 1〉},
each with probability 1/8. Alice then asks Bob for the Z
polarization of both qubits, possible answers being A =
{00, 01, 10, 11}. An answer is correct iff it coincides in the
polarization of the qubit prepared in a Z eigenstate. Bob
can always answer the question correctly by measuring both
qubits in the Z basis.
The quantum retrieval game formalism applies to this prob-
lem although one must admit that it is like cracking a nut with
a sledgehammer. We call this game GZ = (%, σZ) where we
have
∑
s %(s) = ρ = 14/4, and Tr(%(s)) = 1/8 for all s ∈ S.
A formal definition of the utility function σZ can be given as
σZ(s, a) = (s1 ≡ a1 or s2 ≡ a2). We first define the opera-
tors O(a) from theorem 20. Due to symmetry we may restrict
to considering one such operator
O(00) = 4 (%(0,+) + %(0,−) + %(+, 0) + %(−, 0)) (S33)
and find that ‖O(00)‖ = 1 which is a non degenerate eigen-
value for all O(a). The fact that the four corresponding
eigenspaces are orthogonal confirms that 1 is also the phys-
ical value of the game.
The same trivial value of 1 can be achieved for the game in
which Alice requests theX direction polarization of the states.
We will call this game GX = (%, σX). The problem becomes
interesting if Bob is requested provide a guess for both com-
plementary polarizations. There are two relevant possibilities,
both of which will require Bob to give an answer twice as
long as before. The first scenario describes the best case prob-
ability of Bob answering both questions correctly and may be
modeled by a QRG with utility function
G∧ = (%, σ∧) σ∧(s, aXaZ) = σX(s, aX) ∧ σZ(s, aZ).
In the second scenario we are interested in the average num-
ber of questions answered correctly when two complementary
questions are posed and may be modeled by the WQRG with
utility function
Gavg = (%, σavg) σavg(s, aXaZ) = σX(s, aX) + σZ(s, aZ)
2
.
Thanks to symmetries one need only calculate a single
‖O(a)‖ and for concreteness we choose O(+ + 00). For the
conjunction QRG we obtain
O(+ + 00) = 4 (%(0,+) + %(+, 0)) and ‖O++00‖ = 3/4.
For the average WQRG we obtain
O(+ + 00) =2[2%(0,+) + 2%(+, 0) + %(0,−)
+ %(−, 0) + %(+, 1) + %(1,+)] (S34)
and ‖O++00‖ = 1/2 + 1/
√
8 ≈ 0.8536. This is precisely
the optimal fidelity for covariant qubit cloning (i.e. cloning
of equatorial qubits). On the other hand, if Bob is asked the
same question twice instead of complementary questions it is
clear that he will be able to repeat two correct answers. All in
all, if Bob is asked complementary question half of the time
and coinciding questions half of the time he will be able to
emulate an average fidelity of 3/4 +
√
2/8 ≈ 0.927.
Indeed, once we have defined a concrete WQRG, calculat-
ing its selective value becomes an exercise thanks to theorem
20. Furthermore, if the game has sufficient symmetry it will
be possible to prove a coinciding physical values for the game.
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S.3.6. cv-qticket
We will first bound the probability of answering two of
these randomly chosen questions by bounding the selective
value of the corresponding retrieval game. To do this, we
bound the value of a game where r complementary questions
are asked on r qubit pairs (this is precisely the case for one
block when the two random questions are complementary).
σ
(X)
Ftol
(~s,~a(X)) =
 r∑
j=1
σ
(X)
j (sj , a
(X)
j ) ≥ Ftolr

σ
(Z)
Ftol
(~s,~a(Z)) =
 r∑
j=1
σ
(Z)
j (sj , a
(Z)
j ) ≥ Ftolr

σ∧Ftol(~s, (~a
(X),~a(Z))) =σ
(X)
Ftol
(~s,~a(X)) ∧ σ(Z)Ftol(~s,~a(Z))
(S35)
We will not calculate the selective value exactly but give
a bound in terms of theorem 27. In order for the two block
answers to be correct, among the two, at least 2Ftolr answers
should have been provided correctly for individual qubit pairs.
This is a weaker condition since it only imposes that the sum
among the two block answers be sufficiently large, not neces-
sarily implying that they are both above threshold.
σ∧Ftol(~s, (~a
(X),~a(Z))) ≤
 r∑
j=1
σavgj (sj , (a
(X)
j , a
(Z)
j )) ≥ Ftolr

(S36)
The description on the right hand side has precisely the form
required for theorem 27. We conclude that the selective value
and hence the probability within any strategy of providing
valid answers to two complementary questions for the same
block is upper bounded by 2 exp[−rD(Ftol‖1/2 + 1/
√
8)]
(for Ftol > 1/2 + 1/
√
8).
Given two randomly chosen questions for a block there is
a probability of 1/2 that they will coincide and a probabil-
ity 1/2 that they will be complementary. Taking this into
account, the probability for a dishonest holder to correctly
answer two such randomly chosen block questions is upper
bounded by 1/2 + exp[−rD(Ftol‖1/2 + 1/
√
8)]. By tak-
ing r sufficiently large, this value can be guaranteed to be
smaller then 1. Hence, the probability of correctly answering
n such randomly chosen threshold question pairs will be up-
per bounded byB := (1/2+exp[−rD(Ftol, 1/2+1/
√
8)])n
which can be made exponentially close to 1 in n.
S.3.7. Combinatorial bound on choosing and learning
The formulation presented adequately models a scenario in
which the holder of a cv-qticket does not receive any feedback
from the verifiers. However, if the holder of a cv-qticket can
engage in several verification protocols, new possibilities arise
which should be taken into account.
Firstly, by simultaneously engaging in several (v) verifica-
tion protocols with different verifiers, the holder may simul-
taneously have access to v challenge questions. The holder
may then for instance, choose the most similar questions and
attempt to answer these. Furthermore, by successively par-
ticipating in v verification protocols the holder can choose to
perform verifications sequentially and wait for the outcome
of the k-th before choosing which question to answer as the
k + 1-th and providing an answer for it.
In general, if the holder engages in v verification attempts,
he will receive v random questions providing no additional in-
formation on the cv-qticket. There are
(
v
2
)
possible question
pairs among these, each of which can be seen as randomly
chosen. Thus if no feedback is used the probability of an-
swering at least one of these pairs correctly is upper bounded
by
(
v
2
)
B. An example scenario where this bound is relatively
tight is when r is very large and n is relatively small. In this
case, the probability of answering two randomly chosen ques-
tions is well approximated by the collision probability 2−n (
i.e. the probability that two questions coincide ) which grows
precisely as
(
v
2
)
if the holder has access to v independently
drawn questions and may choose to answer any pair.
Suppose now, that the answers to the verifiers are provided
sequentially, so that the decision of which answer to produce
for each verifier may be made dependent on the outcome of
previous verifications. We can safely assume that the answers
to challenge questions are then provided sequentially, each af-
ter receiving the acceptance or rejection of the previous ones.
We can then apply a similar argument to the one exposed for
the proof of qticket security in section S.2 S.2.3 5. This yields
an additional factor of
(
v
2
)
corresponding to the possible feed-
back scenarios up to the point of the second accepted answer,
each of which can be simulated statically (i.e. by assuming the
given feedback and fixing a corresponding POVM to generate
answer up to that point). Hence the total probability for an
interactive strategy with v verification attempts of producing
two or more accepted answers is upper bounded by
(
v
2
)2
B.
It may seem artificial for verifiers to select a random ques-
tion each time. Randomness is important in order to avoid
revealing information about the issued cv-qticket. However,
the verifier may choose a random question once and for all
and ask it until it is answered correctly. Once it has been an-
swered correctly, the verifier knows that the cv-qticket has al-
ready been redeemed and can thus reject all subsequent verifi-
cation attempts. This is similar to the kind of scheme used for
prepaid telephone cards discussed in the applications section.
However, the quantum case provides an advantage since one
may have multiple verifiers which do not communicate. In a
simple example with two verifiers, two composite questions
may be chosen such that they are complementary on every
qubit pair (i.e. one question is chosen at random and uniquely
determines the other).
S.4. APPLICATIONS
Our quantum information application attempts to reduce
quantum requirements to a minimum. However, even prepare
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and measure qubit memories remain technologically challeng-
ing. For problems admitting a classical solution, such an ap-
proach is likely to be technologicaly less demanding. In other
words, relevant applications for prepare and measure quantum
memories will be those solving problems for which no clas-
sical solutions are known. In this section we discuss some
problems with classical solutions and propose refinement of
such problems for which no classical solution is possible.
S.4.1. Enforcing single usage with a single verifier
For some applications, the no cloning of quantum informa-
tion is only an apparent advantage. Our qticket and cv-qticket
constructions can guarantee an exponentially small double us-
age probability. However, this is not an impresive feat for sce-
narios where there is a single verifier or if the verifiers have
acces to realtime communication with a centralized database.
In this case, a randomly chosen classical ticket has equaly
good properties. After a ticket is succesfully redeemed once,
it can be removed from the central database, making it invalid
for any succesive verification attempt. In fact this classical
strategy is widely used for crediting prepaid phone lines with
a client calling a toll free number and typing the purchased
ticket number in order to credit a telephone account. Thus in
such scenarios, the quantum strategy does not provide addi-
tional protection with respect to a classical solution.
S.4.2. Multiple non communicating verifiers
In scenarios with multiple non communicating verifiers,
(cv-)qtickets provide a soution to a problem where all classi-
cal approaches fail. We describe a witness protection program
as an example of how such a scenario might look like.
In a witness protection program, a governmental institution
decides to give asylum to a key eye witness to whom an un-
forgeable quantum token is issued. This token can be used by
the witness (holder) to claim asylum in any of a set of partic-
ipating hotels (verifiers). The issuer also provides all hotels
with the necessary information to verify the tokens. When
using the token, neither the eye-witness nor the chosen ho-
tel wish to divulge the locale where the witness is hosted,
thus protecting both from being targets of an attack. This in-
cludes suspending communication between participating ho-
tels as well as with the issuing authority. Any classical so-
lution can not prevent a sufficiently resourceful holder from
making copies of the received token, thus hotels are forced to
communicate in order to avoid its double use. In this case,
a quantum solution based on unforgeable tokens is the sole
possibility to satisfy these unique constraints.
S.4.3. Reduced availability under sporadic verification
In principle, a centralized database may guarante that clas-
sical ticket are only redeemed once. However, there are situ-
ations where the ticket should be available only to one holder
Figure S3: 1) The issuing entity hands a qticket to the key witness.
2) It provides the hotels with the secret classical description which
will be used to verify it. 3a) An honest witness choses a hotel and
physically transfer the qticket for verification. It will be accepted
as long as the level of accumulated noise is below threshold. 3b) A
dishonest witness will fail to counterfeit his/her qticker to provide
acomodation for an additional guest. However, there is no way of
avoiding a valid qticket from changing hands.
at a time and the non-clonable nature of a qticket allows en-
forcing this. One such example is the sporadic control of
tickets required for a given service. For concreteness, imag-
ine a qticket which is valid for making use of a public trans-
portation network. Commuters are sporadically controled, at
which point if they are found to have a invalid qticket they
are charged an important fine, whereas if they are found to
hold a valid qticket, they are provided with a fresh substitute.
If the transportation tickets are classical, sporadic control can
not avoid counterfeited copies in the hands of coluding com-
muters from circulating simultaneously. The deceiving com-
muters need only communicate classicaly among each other
before and after they are controled, effectively sharing a single
classical ticket to make use of the service multiple times[S7].
In contrast the unavailability of long distance quantum comu-
nication would disallows them to share a qticket in such a way
(i.e. each valid qticket may only be at one place at a time).
S.4.4. The Quantum Credit Card
Having developed a single verification, noise tolerant, non-
forgeable token, such as the cv-qticket, it is now possible to
examine generalizations to interesting composite protocols.
For instance, Gavinsky’s proposal[S5] allows for multiple ver-
ification rounds to be performed on a single token, while also
ensuring that the token can not be split into two independently
valid subparts. Such a construction may be seen as a quan-
tum credit card. Indeed, the classical communication which
takes place with the issuer (bank) to verify the cv-qticket (via
“challenge” questions) may be intentionally publicized to a
merchant who needs to be convinced of the card’s validity.
An alternate possibility is to follow the original interpretation
as a quantum cash token where verification is performed by
the receiver each time the “money” changes hands.
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S.4.5. Excluding eavesdropers
While qtickets do not provide additional advantage against
dishonest holder in the scenario of a single verifier quantum-
ness may provide an advantage against eavesdroping and un-
trusted communication. In order to make online banking more
secure, Banks routinely use TANs (transaction authentication
numbers) as an additional security measure. The bank sends
its client a list of TANs via postal service in addition to an
online password which is set up via another channel. Each
time a bank transaction is requested online by the client, the
bank requests a TAN from the list to guarantee the authentic-
ity of the transaction. An impostor then needs to know both
a secret password used by the user and some TANs, thus in-
creasing the difficulty to succesfully impersonate a transaction
with respect to any single security measure. However, since
TANs are classical objects it is conceivable that an eaves-
droper may learn them while remaining undetected (imagine
an eavesdroper taking xray pictures of the correspondence).
This means that with some effort of the eavesdroper the addi-
tional security measure becomes ineffective.
This problem can be straightforwardly resolved by using
quantum prepare and measure memories. Even if a cv-qticket
is sent via an untrusted optical fiber or postal service, the re-
ceiver may openly communicate with the issuer and sacrifice
some of the received qubits in order to obtain a bound on how
much information could have leaked to eavesdropers. This
is precisely the approach taken in QKD to obtain a statistical
bound on the information that has leaked out. Gavinsky’s Q
scheme, allowing multiple verification rounds may be reinter-
preted as quantum TAN lists. The holder of a quantum TAN
list may verify its validity, and perform a transaction by pub-
licly communicating with the bank. If the quantum TAN list
is verified to be legitimate, then the probability of an eaves-
droper getting verified by using the leaked information will
be negligible (exponentially small). In turn, the cv-qtickets
described in the main text and appendix may be used as basic
building blocks for such a scheme in the precense of noise.
S.4.6. Combining with classical computational assumptions
The qticket and cv-qticket protocols proposed require the
verifiers to have acces to secret information (i.e. information
which is sufficient to produce additional tokens). This poses
a problem for situations where the verifiers can not be trusted
with such sensitive information. Idealy, it should be possible
to verify the tokens relying exclusively on publicly available
information. Seeking to achieve this, Bennet et. al. [S6] made
an ingenious proposal based on computational assumptions.
We consider a family of such proposals and show that they
are not secure.
The proposal of Bennet et. al can be abstractly presented
as follows. The mint secretly keeps the solution to a publicly
known instance of a computationally hard problem. The prob-
lem instance may have been generated by the mint from the
solution in the first place. It is then possible for the mint to in-
teractively convince anyone that it has the solution to the prob-
lem without giving away any additional information about the
solution. Such a method for convincing is known as a sta-
tistical zero knowledge proof (SZKP). For many problems,
SZKP can be set up in a cut and choose fashion. This is,
the mint “cuts” the secret solution into two parts m1 and m2
which toghether allow reconstructing the secret solution but
independently provide no usefull information.
We provide a simple example for this in the context of graph
isomorphism. The mint generates two isomorphic graphs G1
and G2, publishes them but keeps the isomorphism secret.
The mint can then proceed as follows to convince someone
that it has a proof of G1 ≡ G2. The mint generates a random
graph Gc ≡ G1 (which may be seen as the “cut”) by random-
ply permuting the vertices in G1 and offers to provide either
the isomorphism provingGc ≡ G1 or the one forGc ≡ G2. A
verifier then randomly “chooses” which of the two to request,
a dishonest proover (lacking a proof of G1 ≡ G2) would have
no more than a 50% chance of being capable to answer cor-
rectly. Thus by repeating this procedure n times, a verifier
can be 1 − 2−n certain of the proof being conveyed. On the
other hand, the verifier learns no information about the secret
solution G1 ≡ G2 which it could not have easily obtained
independently.
In our language, Bennet et al. go one step further and pro-
pose that the mint hardcode such SZKPs into a token com-
posed of a classical part and a quantum state. The holder of
such a token would thus have access to a one time SZKP of the
problem openly published by the mint. In order to do this, the
“cut” is provided classicaly, whereas the two possible proofs
are encoded in a quantum state such that either of them may be
extracted by measuring the state but not both. As we will show
however, this requirement can not be fullfiled if one allows ar-
bitrary coherent operations to be performed on the quantum
tokens (i.e. security against the most general attacks is impos-
sible).
Suppose that we wish to encode two possible messages m1
and m2 into a large quantum state such that an adversary may
learn either of them with a very high certainty but may not
learn both of them. In order to show that this is not possible,
we consider the simple scenario where two bits of information
are encoded in a quantum state such that either of them can
be retrieved by measurement with high presicion and show
that it is possible (at least in theory) to retrieve both of them
simultaneously with high succes rate.
Consider a family of quantum states ρα,β used to multiplex
the classical bits α, β ∈ {0, 1}. That the holder of the quan-
tum state can extract either α or β may be expressed by
Tr[P aαρα′,β′ ] ≥ (1− )δα,α′
Tr[P bβρα′,β′ ] ≥ (1− )δβ,β′
(S37)
where {P aα} and {P bβ} are two projective measurements in-
dexed over α and β respectively (i.e. P a0 + P
a
1 = P
b
0 + P
b
1 =
1). We wish to show that by succesively performing both
projective measurements both α and β may be obtained with
relatively high certainty. Hence it is impossible to multiplex
the α and β such that either may be recovered reliably but
attempting to measure both remains highly unreliable. The
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POVM corresponding to sequential measurement is given by
P˜α,β = P
a
αP
b
βP
a
α and we will show that it is good to order
√

Tr[P aαP
b
βP
a
αρα,β ]
= Tr[P bβρα,β ]− Tr[P bβP aα¯ρα,βP aα¯ ]− (Tr[P bβP aα¯ρα,βP aα ] + c.c)
≥1− 2− 2
√
Tr[P bβP
a
αρα,βP
a
α ] Tr[ρα,βP
a
α¯ ]
≥1− 2− 2√
(S38)
where we have used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to go ob-
tain the second line simplifying further with P aα  (P aα)2 and
P bβ  (P bβ)2. Hence if we make  arbitrarily small, this will
also make the probability of extracting both indices arbitrarily
close to 1.
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